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PARETO-IMPROVEMENT IN MATCHING PROBLEMS
TROUGH GENETIC ALGORITHMS
VIRGINIE MARELLI, ANTONIO NICOLO`, TIMOTEO CARLETTI
Abstract
Often matching problems and problems of coalition formation, are compu-
tationally hard to solve and exisiting algorithms are able to find allocations
that are stable but not Pareto-otpimal. We show in two specific applications,
hedonic games and school choice with constraints, that Genetic Alghritms
can be succesfully applied to find outcomes that Pareto-improve over allo-
cations obtained by existing algorithms.
1. Introduction
Very often operational optimisation problems do not fit in the “classical”
optimisation framework, that requires smooth functions and the possibility
to access, speedily and easily, to their derivatives. Actually the former ones
usually lack both requirements, functions are defined on discrete variables,
sometimes also on categorical ones, and thus derivatives do not exist; how-
ever, even when derivative are computable in principle, the huge number of
involved variables or the definition of function through recursive schemes,
make the computation of the latter almost impossible.
Some of the above problems, can be solved or their impact be reduced,
using heuristic methods. Genetic Algorithms, for short GAs in the following,
belong to this class. They are directly inspired by biology and Darwinian
evolution: organisms are suited to their habitats (Adaptation); offsprings are
similar but not equal to their parents (Inheritance); new, better adapted
types of organisms, emerge and those that fail to change adequately are
subject to extinction (Natural selection). Thus the fittest individuals have
a high chance of having a large number of offsprings and finally their traits
can spread across the population, generation by generation.
GAs are aimed at exploiting these key concepts for problem solving. The
algorithm first finds partial solutions, that are then filtered and improved
to select the “best ones”, that is the ones closer to the optimal solution we
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are looking for. By their very first definition, GAs are blind search optimi-
sation methods, exploring the solutions’ space without being constrained by
derivative or local minima.
They also avoid numerical errors since they only use value of the objective
function and thus no gradient or approximate models should be computed.
For all these reasons, they are prone to be applied to a wide range of
problems, without too much effort. Of course, the more is possible to adapt
a GA to the problem under investigation, the better will be the quality
of the solution. The aim of this paper is to apply GAs on two distinct
problems: the hedonic games [ABH11, ABS13, BJ02] and the students-school
assignment [GS62, Pat11, RS90, Abd05, AS03]. Usually, in game theory,
genetic algorithms are used to reproduce the behaviour that people have
in the laboratory, playing games (adaptive behaviour) 1. However, in this
paper, we chose a different approach: using genetic algorithm to look for
outcomes that improve over allocations obtained by other algorithms. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first time that GAs are applied, in this
way, to a matching problem, being the literature very scarce [AC99].
Matching is a well known problem and relevant to many fields of econom-
ics research; the available literature provides nice theoretical results, but
whose operational implementation is often by far unreachable, because di-
rect application of such results will produce algorithm whose time complexity
will be larger than polynomial [ABH11, Bal04], but also very cumbersome
whenever we want to add some constraints. Let us finally observe that be-
cause of the combinatoric nature of the problems, brute force enumeration of
all possible cases becomes rapidly impossible even for small sizes problems.
In a first part of this paper we consider the problem of the formation of
coalitions and in particular the renowned hedonic games.
A finite set of players must be divided according to their preferences, into
disjoint groups, called coalitions, that should partition all the individuals. In
the following we will focus on anonymous games with single-peaked prefer-
ences, meaning that players only care about the size of their coalition or the
amount of public good it produces. A partition is stable if there is no envy
among the players, let us observe that stability is a hard condition to be sat-
isfied and hence we must often rely on a relaxed weaker notion, to be able to
have positive results. In this setting, Bogomolnaia et al. [BJ02] propose an
algorithm which gives a stable and weakly Pareto-optimal2 partition under
some suitable conditions. Unfortunately, if these assumptions are not met,
the algorithm can only find a stable partition. As already stated most of
the existing algorithms are not totally satisfying, we thus hereby introduce
a new method based on GAs that allows us to Pareto-improve the result by
Bogomolnaia et al. [BJ02]. Such a Pareto-improvement is very interesting
1For more details, see Haruvy et al. [HRU06] and U¨nver [Unv05].
2Weakly Pareto-optimal means that there exists no partition that all players strictly
prefer.
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since some players are better off, while the remaining ones are left with their
previous assignment.
The second matching problem we are interested in, is the matching in
school choice with constraints and indifferences. This problem is more com-
plex than the previous one and moreover, schools and students around the
world are currently faced to it: assigning students to schools has never been
easy since there is always someone to complain. Giving every student his
preferred school is not always possible because of the limited schools’ capac-
ity. Moreover, some well appreciated schools are overwhelmed by students
proposals and cannot deal with it. That is why it is common to use a central
house to avoid congestion and to try to satisfy students as well as schools.
One usually uses the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) [GS62] which
yields a stable matching that is optimal for students. Here, stable means
that no-one has incentive to break the deal (the inscription). Furthermore,
this direct mechanism is strategy-proof [GS62] for students, i.e. their dom-
inant strategy is to reveal their true preferences.
Since every school chooses the way it ranks students, there exists some
inequalities among the latter. To solve this problem, states introduce quotas
to fight again social segregation or economic segregation [Abd05, EHYY12].
Every student gets a type, for instance race or social status; quotas are in-
troduced to regulate the number of students of each type that should be
present in every school. Let us observe that either quotas can be strictly
respected (hard bounds approach) or they should serve more as guidelines
(soft bounds approach) and thus students’ preferences are considered firstly,
see [EHYY12]. Another source of complexity arises when schools can not
strictly rank all students and a tie-breaking rule is needed in order to use the
DAA [APR09, EE08]. As a consequence of this random sorting, the DAA
does not longer find necessarily an optimal matching. This loss of utility
raises the following question: can efficiency be restored? Is there a mech-
anism that Pareto-improves upon the results obtained using the existing
algorithms? Our goal is to positively answer to these questions by introduc-
ing a new method based on GAs to this problem, more precisely we will show
that the efficiency can be partly restored and the solution Pareto-improved.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section 2 we will provide
a short but comprehensive introduction to genetic algorithms; then in sec-
tion 3 we will introduce the Hedonic Games, some results available in the
literature and our new method. Section 4 will be devoted to the presentation
of the Student–School matching problem, once again after some definitions
and already known results, we will present our method and numerical sim-
ulations. Finally Section 5 will be devoted to rise our conclusions and to
present some open questions that need some further studies.
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2. Genetic Algorithms: a rush course
The goal of this section is to present a short introduction of Genetic
Algorithms; the literature is extremely large, we thus prefer let the inter-
ested reader to consult Goldberg, [Gol89] and Mitchel, [Mit98]. GAs are
optimisation methods inspired by evolutionary genetic, their goal is to find
individuals, i.e. solutions, who best fit to their environment, i.e. whose
quality is very high in the under scrutiny problem.
Because, evolution is largely based on genetic, the vocabulary of GA is
very close to the latter. For instance, a chromosome will denote a partial
solution, and it will be composed by genes which determine the quality of the
solution, that is the fitness of the chromosome. Each gene can take several
possible values, called allele, and the position of the gene in the chromosome
is named, the locus. A set of chromosomes forms the population.
The GAs can be applied on a wide range of problems because they don’t
use derivative neither they assume continuity for the objective function.
They are mainly blind search procedures, exploiting only the coding and
the objective function to determine plausible solutions for the next steps.
In this section, we will limit ourselves to present a basic GA, however as
already remarked, the goodness of a GA can greatly increase whenever the
researcher adapt it as much as possible to the problem to be solved. We will
present more details about this point in the 3.5 and in the 4.3.
2.1. Encoding the problem. The first step is to encode the problem:
associate to each chromosome a value for the objective function. Using,
for instance, a simple binary value 3 for each gene, a chromosome will be
a string of 0’s and 1’s; the number of genes that should be used will be
dictated by the problem. In any case once this length has been fixed, all
the population will be composed by chromosomes of the same length, N .
The main goal of the coding is to propose a way to compute a numerical
value of the objective function starting from a chromosome. Assume for
instance the problem is to maximise a function of a real variable, then a
possible coding could be to associate to each chromosome a number written
in its binary form. Let us observe that often the GA is designed as not to
maximise directly the objective function but a related function called fitness
function, the fitness should give a measure of the level of adaptation of an
individual in its environment; in the rest of this section we will use both
terms interchangeably. The values of the alleles in a chromosome define its
genotype, while the value of the objective function on a chromosome is called
phenotype.
2.2. Creation of the population. Once the encoding has been chosen,
we have to create the initial population of chromosomes, that is a set of po-
tential solutions. However, very often the latter are chosen at random in the
3We will see in the next sections that this encoding is not sufficient to solve the hedonic
problem or the students-schools matching problem.
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solution space, in such a way to avoid any bias. The size of the population,
Np, depends once again on the problem to be solved: a larger population
will allow to explore, in principle, a larger portion of the solution space 4,
however the algorithm speed is inversely proportional to the population size.
2.3. The main GA loop. Starting from the initial population a new one,
with the same size Np, will be constructed using three operators acting
directly on the chromosomes: selection, crossover and mutation. This loop
will be iterated until a stop criterion will be reached; usually this can be
given either in terms ofmaximum number of generations allowed, that is how
many times the loop should be performed, either in terms of the objective
function, for instance the mean value of the latter on the whole population
should be larger than a threshold.
Let us analyse in details each operator.
2.3.1. Selection. Individuals are selected in the current population, G0, to
form an intermediary population G
(s)
1 , usually this population has the same
size of the initial one. Copying natural evolution, we allow best fitted in-
dividuals to have a larger chance to survive and thus to pass into G
(s)
1 , in
other terms the selection mechanism will be based on the fitness function.
There are several possibilities to perform such selection, the simplest and
most used one is the roulette wheel; other methods do exist, for instance the
tournament, the elitism. In the roulette wheel, the fitness is computed for
each individual in G0, then the probability to select individual i–th is given
by fi/
∑
fi, where fi is the fitness of the i–th individual.
2.3.2. Crossover. The crossover operator mimics the reproduction of the
individuals. Two chromosomes are selected, usually with a uniform random
probability, and with probability pX they are recombined and their offsprings
set into an intermediary population G
(X)
1 , otherwise with probability 1−pX
the parents pass directly to G
(X)
1 . The recombination is once again inspired
to biology, and in the simplest case it consists in cutting both chromosomes
at some locus l and then to exchange the two pieces of chromosomes to form
the two offsprings. The rationale of this operator is that good parents can
produce better offsprings by passing pieces of genome. Other possibilities
do exist, for instance the two-points crossover or more technical ones as the
one that will be presented and used in the next sections.
2.3.3. Mutation. The role of the mutation operator is to slightly change the
genome of the offspring with respect to the one of the parent and thus to
locally explore the solution space in a neighbourhood of the parent chromo-
some. With probability pm each gene of each chromosome in the population
can mutate, that is change its value; if the chosen coding is a binary allele,
4Actually this is true if the diversity of the chromosomes in the population is high, geno-
type diversity, or if the values of the objective function computed on the whole population
are scattered enough, phenotype diversity.
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then this means to exchange 0 and 1, if other codings have been chosen,
the mutation will be accordingly defined. Because usually pm is very small,
inspect all the genes of all the chromosomes to decide if a mutation should
be performed is very time consuming, we can thus use an alternative way
consisting of computing the expected number of mutations. We will have
in the whole population on average pmNNp mutations performed, being the
process a Bernoulli one. Then this exact number of chromosomes are se-
lected and the mutation occurs by randomly choosing the loci and changing
the value of the corresponding gene. This will produce a third intermediary
population G
(m)
1 whose size is not fixed a priori.
2.3.4. Next generation. Finally, starting from the current population G0 we
constructed three populations G
(s)
1 , G
(X)
1 and G
(m)
1 , the next population
G1 will be obtained by selecting Np individuals from G
(s)
1 ∪ G
(X)
1 ∪ G
(m)
1 .
Once again such individuals are chosen according to their fitness but other
methods do exist.
3. Hedonic Game
Forming coalitions is an extremely important issue that can be found in
several fields ranging from socio-economics to political groups, from students
clubs to sport teams, just to mention few of them. Despite these problems
occur daily, find a solution has never been a trivial problem. We decided
to focus here on hedonic games, where players only care about their own
coalition and not about the other ones, in other words, a player’s utility only
depends on his coalition. When players have preferences over all possible
coalitions they could belong to, the problem is quite complicated. In most of
the cases, a stable partition, i.e. a set of disjoint coalitions, encompassing all
players, cannot be found in polynomial time (for more details see [ABH11,
ABS13]). In the literature there exist some interesting results, if preferences
are restricted to single-peaked and anonymous ones, that is players only care
about the size of their coalition or the public good it produces and not about
the individual players belonging to it. Under these particular assumptions,
Bogomolnaia et al. [BJ02] propose an algorithm to find a stable partition
which may not be necessarily Pareto-optimal. Our goal is thus to propose a
method, based on genetic algorithm, to improve such partition. In the rest
of this section we will introduce the basic problem and notations, then the
results of Bogomolnaia et al. and finally the genetic algorithm adapted to
this problem and the results.
3.1. Definitions and notations. Our approach is based on the paper [BJ02]
by Bogomolnaia et al. and all definitions and notations below are adapted
from this paper.
Consider a finite set of n players, N = {1, . . . , n}, a coalition is a set
S ⊆ P(N), and a partition of N is a collection of coalitions Π = {Sk}
K
k=1
such that Sk ⊆ N,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}; Sk ∩ Sj = ∅,∀k 6= j and ∪
K
k=1Sk = N .
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Each player has preferences over possible coalitions, that can be repre-
sented by an order relation i (complete, transitive and reflexive) over the
set {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S}. Given the partition Π, SΠ(i) is the set S ∈ Π such that
i ∈ S. A game (N,) is formed by a set of players N and their preferences
profile .
Preferences of a player are anonymous if ∀S1, S2 ∋ i,
♯S1 = ♯S2 implies that i is indifferent between S1 and S2
where ♯S denotes the number of players in S.
Let c(S) ∈ R denote the level of production of coalition S, that only de-
pends on the number of players belonging to S, for instance it can be the
cardinality of S.
A player i’s preferences on some set {1, . . . ,K} ⊆ R are single-peaked
if there exists a number pi, called i’s peak, such that ∀S1, S2 ∋ i, c(S1) =
s1, c(S2) = s2 and s1, s2 ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
[s1 < s2 6 pi or s1 > s2 > pi]⇒ S2 ≻i S1
A partition Π is Pareto-optimal if there exists no other partition that
Pareto-dominates it:
∄Π′ such that ∀i ∈ N, SΠ′(i) i SΠ(i) et ∃j : SΠ′(j) ≻j SΠ(j)
A partition Π is weakly Pareto-optimal if there exists no other parti-
tion in which every player is better off:
∄Π′ such that ∀i ∈ N, SΠ′(i) ≻i SΠ(i)
Stability can be defined in various ways but we will only focus on two defi-
nitions.
A partition Π is Nash stable if ∀i : SΠ(i) i Sk ∪ {i}, ∀Sk ∈ Π ∪ {∅}
A partition Π is Individually stable if ∄i ∈ N and Sk ∈ Π ∪ {∅} such
that Sk ∪ {i} ≻i SΠ(i) and ∀j ∈ Sk, Sk ∪ {i} j Sk
A coalition is said to be opened if at least one player can be added to
this coalition without making any player worse off. Otherwise, the coalition
is said to be closed.
To go further, we also need those two following definitions, introduced by
Bogomolnaia et al.
Definition 1 (Ordered characteristics). Each coalition S is described by a
characteristic level of production c(S) that lies between 0 and ♯S. Players
have single-peaked preferences over the public good c(S), with peaks pi such
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that S i S
′ ⇐⇒ [c(S′) < c(S) 6 pi or c(S
′) > c(S) > pi].
A hedonic game has ordered characteristics if players’ preferences are single-
peaked over c(S) and c(S) satisfies the following properties:
(1) If c(S) < ♯S, then c(S) = pi, with i ∈ S;
(2) If i /∈ S, j /∈ S, and pi > pj then c(S ∪ i) > c(S ∪ j). Furthermore if
c(S ∪ i) > pi then c(S ∪ i) = c(S ∪ j)
Definition 2 (Consistency). A hedonic game with ordered characteristics
is consistent if
[∃i,∃S such that c(S ∪ i) = pi < c(S) < min
j∈S
pj] =⇒ c(T ∪ i) 6 pi,∀T
After having introduced the preliminary definitions, we are now able to
present some results.
3.2. Results. The next theorem is given by Bogomolnaia et al. [BJ02].
Theorem 3. If a hedonic game has ordered characteristics, then there ex-
ists an individually stable coalition partition. If in addition, consistency is
satisfied, there exists a weakly Pareto-optimal individually stable coalition
partition.
To prove this theorem authors propose an algorithm that yields an in-
dividually stable coalition partition and in case of consistency, a weakly
Pareto-optimal and individually stable outcome. We refer the interested
reader to [BJ02] to have more details.
3.3. Bogomolnaia et al.’s Algorithm. Initially all players are sorted in
increasing number of their peak, that is i ≥ j =⇒ pi ≥ pj. Then the
algorithm proceeds as follows:
(1) The first coalition S1 is created by adding firstly the player n. Then
players k < n are added to S1 as long as pk ≥ c({k, .., n}) and
{k + 1, . . . , n} is opened to k (acceptation rule);
(2) The next coalitions (Sk)k≥2 are formed in a similar way as the first
one, except that they begin by adding the player with the highest
peak not yet in a already formed coalition. Then for j ∈ {1, . . . , k-1},
if Sj is opened, we check for every player i of Sk, to whom Sj is
opened, if i would be strictly better off in Sj (c(Sj ∪ i) ≻i c(Sk)
and c(Sj ∪ i) f c(Sj),∀f ∈ Sj). If is the case, i is removed from
Sk to Sj. If at this stage, there still exists a coalition Sj opened to
some players of Sk, then all players, to whom a coalition is opened
and who are indifferent to move to this coalition, are moved to Sj.
For each player removed, we check if the player with the highest
peak, not yet into a coalition, could be added to Sk (respecting the
acceptation rule);
(3) The algorithm ends when every player belongs to a coalition.
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This algorithm finds a solution in polynomial time and always yields an
individually stable partition. However, if the condition of consistency is not
satisfied, the partition obtained by the algorithm may not be Pareto-optimal.
Here we develop a general hedonic game that has ordered characteristics but
is not consistent.
3.4. Non-consistent game. Let 1 ≤ a < b < n and players’ preferences
to be single-peaked, then the public good c is defined as follow:
c(S) =
{
♯S if ♯S < a or either ♯S > b
min{♯S,mini∈S pi} otherwise.
It is easy to prove that this game has ordered characteristics and it is not
consistent.
Let us show this second point. By definition of consistency we should find
i and S such that c(S ∪ i) = pi < c(S) < minj∈S pj and then it will follows
that for all T : c(T ∪ i) ≤ pi. Let us proceed by showing a contradiction; let
us take S such that ♯S < minj∈S pj and a ≤ ♯S < b and choose a player i
such that pi < ♯S+1, thus we have c(S∪ i) = pi < ♯S+1 < ♯S < minj∈S pj.
If we take T such that ♯T > b we get c(T ∪ i) = ♯T +1 > b+1 > ♯S+1 > pi,
which proves the non-consistency.
3.5. Numerical simulations. A theoretical characterisation of a GA is
almost impossible to be done, we thus resort to numerical simulations to
check their efficiency.
In order to apply GA, we need first to model our problem. A solution or
chromosome is a partition, modelled by a vector whose components represent
players and the value of each component is the partition to which the player
belongs. We also choose the following arbitrary representation of utility for
each player i:
ui(S) =
{
1− ri(♯S)−1
n
if i ∈ S
0 otherwise
,
where ri(♯S) is the position of ♯S in the preferences of i. For example, if i
gets his peak, his utility will be equal to 1. To ensure the partitions we are
dealing with are stable, the fitness of a partition which is not individually
stable is set to zero, otherwise the fitness is defined as the normalised sum
of single utility functions. Thereby, the fitness lies between 0 and 1.
This fitness can be used as objective function to be maximised by a GA. In
this way we get good results since very often the GA finds a partition with
a higher fitness than the one obtained via the algorithm of Bogomolnaia
et al. [BJ02], see Figure 1. However, this approach is somehow subjec-
tive since it is based on a given fitness function, which after all has been
fixed arbitrarily. A second approach can be thus considered that consists
in Pareto-improving the partition found by the algorithm of Bogomolnaia
et al. [BJ02]. Let us call this partition, Π; a Pareto-improvement is defined
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as a partition where all players are at least as well as in the previous as-
signment and some are better off. We can thus define a GA whose fitness
function is computed as follows: we check whether the partition, we eval-
uate, is a Pareto-improvement of Π and if not, its fitness is penalised and
made smaller than the fitness of Π, for instance by multiplying it by a small
number, in this way we can ensure that partitions with a higher fitness than
Π, are Pareto-improvements.
We can now define the various operators used by our genetic algorithm.
The crossover operator is the basic one previously described, that is the 1
point crossover. On the other hand, we cannot use the simple mutation op-
erator because it would only change one player from his coalition to another.
This would not lead to an improvement since the algorithm of Bogomolnaia
has already checked that no-one could be better off by changing of coali-
tion, we thus realise a 2 steps mutation. The first step consists of randomly
picking a chromosome in the population, choosing randomly a coalition and
moving every players from that coalition to another existing one, by simply
changing the number of their coalition. During the second step, a partition
is randomly picked up and from this partition, one player is randomly chosen
and moved to one another coalition. Those two operations are performed
a certain number of times (see 2.3.3). Finally, the selection operator is the
standard one, where higher probability of selection is given to best fitted
partitions.
Here are the results for one simulation, with 100 players, the aim being
the maximisation of the utilitarian function:
DRAFT 11
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Figure 1. Utilitarian function (fitness), for n = 100 and the
parameters of the non-consistent game being a = 25, b = 30.
GA’s parameters are the folowing ones: 700 initial chromo-
somes (within 100 are the partition found by Bogomolnaia
et al.), probability of mutation =0.2, probability of crossover
=0.4, the GA runs for 50 generations. In blue, the utility of
the partition obtained by the algorithm of Bogomolnaia et
al. and in red the utility at every step of the genetic algo-
rithm.
In this simulation, we see that the utility of the partition of Bogomolnaia
et al. is not maximum and that genetic algorithm, thanks to mutation
and reproduction, can find partitions with higher utility. However, this
optimisation is arbitrary (depending of the choice of the fitness) and we
prefer to focus on Pareto-improving the partition by Bogomolnaia et al., see
the following.
The following simulation is done using 20 players, a varies from 1 to 18
and b from a+ 1 to 19. Single-peaked preferences are created randomly as
well as the initial population of partitions. The remaining parameters used
by the genetic algorithm are given in the following table:
• 500 initial partitions, among which 100 are the partition Π;
• probability of mutation 0.1;
• probability of crossover 0.4;
• the GA runs for 20 generations.
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For every set of parameters, the algorithm is executed 100 times and the
percentage of Pareto-improvement5 is reported in Table 1.
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
a
b
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 2 11 3 8 6 5 2 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 - 9 2 6 3 4 6 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 - - 4 4 7 7 3 4 3 1 2 0 2 3 2 1 0 2
4 - - - 2 4 4 1 2 4 3 3 4 1 2 2 1 3 2
5 - - - - 0 7 3 2 1 3 1 0 1 3 0 1 4 3
6 - - - - - 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 2 0 0 1 2
7 - - - - - - 2 1 5 1 2 3 1 0 0 1 1 4
8 - - - - - - - 4 1 2 3 2 2 0 0 1 1 1
9 - - - - - - - - 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2
10 - - - - - - - - - 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 0
11 - - - - - - - - - - 4 4 0 4 2 4 1 6
12 - - - - - - - - - - - 3 2 3 1 2 0 2
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 4 1 2 2 3
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 3 2 2 2
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 3 3 6
16 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 4 7
17 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 1
18 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
Table 1. Percentage of Pareto-improvement found by GA,
out of 100 simulations
We can clearly see from the previous table that for almost every set of pa-
rameters a and b, GA finds a Pareto-improvement of the partition obtained
by the algorithm [BJ02]. This improvement can be quantified as varying
from 1 up to 11 percent. We found on average of 4.08 players who are bet-
ter off (when there is a Pareto-improvement) that is close to 20 percent of
players that are better off. Unfortunately, we don’t know if the partition
we get from the genetic algorithm is Pareto-optimal, because this algorithm
is not deterministic. Furthermore, according to Aziz et al. [ABH11] veri-
fying if a partition is Pareto-optimal (under anonymous preferences) has a
non-polynomial time complexity. So, the only thing we can say is that this
new partition dominates the one found by the algorithm of Bogomolnaia et
al. [BJ02]. We will not report here the simulations done using 50 or 100
players being the results similar to those reported in Table 1.
5For each simulation, we only consider the best partition (stable and with the highest
fitness) and whether it is a Pareto-improvement of the partition by Bogomolnaia et al.
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4. Constrained school choice with indifferences
In their celebrated 1962 paper [GS62], Gale and Shapley developed in the
framework of the marriage problem, the algorithm called Deferred Accep-
tance Algorithm (DAA). The aim of the latter is to match men and women
such that everyone is matched with its feasible preferred choice (efficiency)
and no-one has incentive to get divorced and exchange partner (stability).
This algorithm has been revisited, exploited and used in many different set-
tings. In this paper, we will be interested of its application to the case of
many-to-one matching in school choice.
The problem is defined by a set of students, a set of schools and a com-
plete set of preferences of each group over the agents of the opposite set.
Furthermore, schools have a limited number of seats available and it is not
always possible to give every student his first choice. Three algorithms are
usually used to solve this problem [EE08], however for a sake of simplicity
we will only consider in the following the DAA. We advice the interested
reader to have a look at [Rot08], for more details about the history of the
DAA.
To avoid social segregation, often schools have to respect some quotas,
that is to reserve a certain number of seats to students of each type. Stu-
dents’ type is usually defined according to socio-economic characteristics of
the students, like income, ethnicity, gender, etc. Quotas are strong con-
straints (hard bound approach) of the matching problem, when is the leg-
islator imposes that quotas have to be respected irrespectively of students’
preferences. On the other hand, quotas can also be seen as guidelines, a soft
bounds approach that will be explained in details later. Beside these facts,
let us stress that another problem appears when schools cannot strictly rank
every student and these indifferences lead to a loss of efficiency.
The goal of this section is to present a new method, based on GA, aimed
at increasing the efficiency of the matching algorithm.. Let us start by
introducing some definitions and notations.
4.1. Definitions and notations. A constrained school choice where schools
have weak preferences over students can be modelled as follows:
(1) A set of n students : S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn};
(2) A set of m schools : C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm};
(3) A capacity vector : q = {qc1 , qc2 , . . . , qcm}, where qc is the number
of seats available in the school c;
(4) Students’ strict preferences (complete, transitive and reflexive rela-
tion) over schools: P = {Ps1 , Ps2 , . . . , Psn}, where ciPsjck means
that student sj prefers school ci to school ck. Let Ps denote the set
of strict preferences of s over C ∪ {s}, Q ≡
∏
s∈S Ps and
Q−s ≡
∏
s′∈S\{s} Ps′ ;
(5) A set of k types: T = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk} and a type function; f : S →
T , f(s) = τj , where τj is the type of student s
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(6) Schools’ weak preferences (complete, transitive and reflexive rela-
tion) over students : = {c1 ,c2 , . . . ,≻cm}, where si ≻cj sk means
that cj strictly prefers students si to student sk and si ∼cj sk means
that school cj is indifferent between both students. Let Cc be the set
of all weak preferences of school c over the set of students S and let
C ≡
∏
c∈C Cc;
(7) Each school has constraints over types: qT
c
= (qτ1
c
, qτ2
c
, . . . , qτ2
c
)
minimal quotas and qTc = (q
τ1
c , q
τ2
c . . . , q
τ2
c ) maximal quotas, where
qτj
c
is the minimum number of seats that must be available in school
c for students of type τj and q
τj
c is the maximum number of seats
assigned in school c for students of type τj. With q
τi
c
≤ qτic ≤ qc,∀i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, Q = (qT
ci
, qTci), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
We denote a problem of matching with indifferences and constraints by
(S,C, q, T, f, P,, Q) .
We will assume that schools’ preferences are responsive: ∀s, s′ ∈ S,∀R ⊆
S such that s, s′ 6∈ R, R ∪ {s} c R ∪ {s
′} ⇐⇒ s c s
′.
Remark 4. Let us emphasise two basic points:
(1) To avoid impossibility cases, we assume that the number of students
of each type is higher than the sum of minimum quotas of that type,
in every school:
|Sτj | ≥
∑
c∈C
qτj
c
, ∀j ∈ {1 . . . k} ,
where Sτj = {s ∈ S : f(s) = τj};
(2) We will also assume that there are enough seats available for stu-
dents, in other words, that the number of students of each type is
not higher than the sum of maximum quotas of this type, in every
school:
|Sτj | ≤
∑
c∈C
q
τj
c , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} .
We now define a matching as an allocation of students to schools such that
each student is assigned to a school and the number of students matched
with a school is less or equal than its capacity; to handle the case where
a student will not be assigned to any school, we will match the student
with himself. More formally a matching µ is an allocation of schools and
students such that
• |µ(s)| = 1,∀s ∈ S, such as if µ(s) 6= s, then µ(s) ∈ C;
• µ(c) ⊂ S and |µ(c)| ≤ qc,∀c ∈ C;
• µ(s) = c⇐⇒ s ∈ µ(c)
A student s is matched to µ(s) and a school c is assigned the set of stu-
dents µ(c). Let µτj(c) denote the set of student of type τj assigned by µ to
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school c.
A matching rule yields a matching for every preference profile and is
defined as a mapping ϕ from D = (P,) to M (M is the set of all feasible
matchings), ϕ : D →M.
Matching should have some desirable properties like strategy-proofness,
stability and optimality.
A matching rule ϕ is strategy-proof if it is a dominant strategy for each
student to reveal his true preferences 6:
∀s ∈ S,∀c ∈ C,∀P−s ∈ Q−s,∀ ∈ C, ϕ(P−s, Ps,)Psϕ(P−s, P
′
s,),∀P
′
s ∈ Qs .
Where Ps are the true preferences of agent s and P−s are the preferences of
all agents in S but s.
In this paper, we will focus on the soft bounds case 7 and we follow
the notation introduced by Elhers et al. [EHYY12]. Under this approach,
schools do not have to strictly respect the quotas, those are seen as guidelines
and serve to define dynamic priorities among students. Given a school c and
a student of type τ whose type’s minimum level (qτ
c
) is not filled, then we
assign to the latter a high priority over other applying students; to a student
of type τ ′ whose type’s minimum level (qτ
′
c
) is filled but not the maximum
one (qτ
′
c ), we assigned a medium priority and finally to a student of type
τ ′′ whose type’s maximum level (qτ
′′
c ) is filled it is assigned a low priority.
According to the soft bounds approach, schools do not have to strictly fill
the quotas but can admit less students of a type than their floors if no
students with a high priority apply. This approach gives more importance
to students’ preferences than to reduce segregation.
A matching is non-wasteful under soft bounds (NWSB) if for any
school c and student s, cPsµ(s) implies that |µ(c)| = qc. A matching rule is
NWSB if for any preference profile, it yields a matching NWSB.
A matching is stable under soft bounds8 (SUSB) if
∀s ∈ S,∀c ∈ C : cPsµ(s), with f(s) = τi, we have |µ
τi(c)| ≥ qτi
c
and
s′ ≻c s,∀s
′ ∈ µτi(c) and either:
(1) |µτi(c)| ≥ qτic et s
′ ≻c s,∀s
′ ∈ µ(c) such that |µf(s
′)(c)| ≥ q
f(s′)
c ;
or
(2) qτic > |µ
τi(c)| ≥ qτi
c
, and
6Normally, strategy-proofness should encompass all agents however we here only con-
sider the students case because in the college problem, there is no stable matching rule
that is strategy-proof for all agents but there can be matching rules that are strategy-proof
for students [Rot85].
7The interested reader can consult [EHYY12] for the hard bounds approach.
8In [EHYY12], L. Elhers defines a matching fair under soft bounds, that removes
justifiably envy under soft bounds but this is just an extension of the notion of stability
previously defined by Gale and Shapley.
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• |µτj (c)| ≤ q
τj
c ,∀j ∈ {1, .., k} \ {i}; and
• s′ ≻c s,∀s
′ ∈ µ(c), such that q
f(s′)
c > |µf(s
′)(c)| ≥ qτi
c
.
A matching rule is SUSB if for any preference profile it yields a matching
SUSB.
A matching µ is Pareto-optimal9 if there exists no other matching ν that
Pareto-dominates it:
∃s′ ∈ S : ν(s′)Ps′µ(s
′) and ∀s ∈ S \ {s′}, µ(s) = ν(s)
Finally, a matching rule is student-optimal (S-optimal) if it is stable
under soft bounds and for any preference profile, yields a matching Pareto-
optimal among the set of stable matchings.
4.2. Results. In the paper by Elhers et al. [EHYY12], authors present an
algorithm, called Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with soft bounds (DAA-
SB), adapted from the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm by Gale and Shap-
ley [GS62], with the introduction of dynamic priorities, defined according to
the type of students and quotas. Note that schools have strict preferences
over students, we will introduce the indifferences later on.
4.2.1. Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with soft bounds (DAA-SB). Let us
start by briefly introduce this algorithm.
(1) At step 1, every student applies to his favourite school. Schools give
first priorities to their applying students (depending on the number
of applicants of each type): given a school c, for every type τ , if the
number of applying students of type τ is lower than the minimum
quota (qτ
c
), they all get a high priority; if this number is higher than
the minimum quota but lower than the maximum one (qτc ), students
receive a medium priority and finally, if the number of applying
students of type τ is higher than the maximum quota, they get
a low priority. After this phase, every school temporarily assigns
students by filling minimum quotas (if possible), by choosing for
each type τ its favourite qτ
c
students among the applicants. At that
stage, all students with a high priority are assigned to their preferred
school. Then, every school tries to fill its maximum quotas, selecting
its favourite students among the remaining ones, as long as seats are
available. Finally, either the capacity of the school is reached and all
non-assigned students are rejected or every student with a medium
priority has been assigned and school fills the remaining seats with
left low-priority students;
(2) At step k ≥ 2, every student who has been rejected at the previous
step applies to his preferred school c′ among the remaining ones
on his preference list. Then, priorities are calculated again for the
set of new applicants and the temporarily assigned students to c′.
9The optimality is defined according students’ preferences
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Schools assign students following the mechanism described in step 1
and rejected students go to the next step;
(3) The algorithm terminates when every student is assigned to a school
or has been rejected by all schools on his preference list.
Through this algorithm, each student is assigned a dynamic priority at
every step, nevertheless the algorithm ends in finite time because the number
of students and their preferences lists are finite objects.
The first nice property of the DAA − SB is that it is strategy-proof.
If we introduce indifferences among schools’ preferences, in order to ap-
ply the algorithm previously described, we need a tie-breaking rule. Given
a tie-breaking rule t, we denote by DAA − SBt, the DAA − SB using
this tie-breaking rule to create strict preferences. Since the DAA − SB is
strategy-proof for any preference profile, then, it is also strategy-proof for
any tie-breaking rule. In a similar framework, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. [APR09]
analyse the properties of efficiency and strategy-proofness when preferences
are not strict. Let us observe that their study is based on the assumption of
absence of constraints, in the following theorem we will extend the result of
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. about strategy-proofness as to include the constrained
case
Theorem 5. For any tie-breaking rule t, there is no matching rule that is
strategy-proof and Pareto-dominates the DAA− SBt.
The proof of this Theorem follows closely the one by Abdulkadirog˘lu [APR09]
once we have the following lemma
Lemma 6. Suppose that ν dominates µ, the matching obtained by the
DAA − SBt, for any tie-breaking rule t. Then, the same set of students
are matched in both ν and µ.
Proof. If there exists a student s unassigned under ν but assigned under
µ, we have that ν(s) = s and sPsµ(s), thus µ(s) must be unacceptable
for s which is impossible (building of the DAA − SBt). So we have that
|ν(c)| ≥ |µ(c)|,∀c ∈ C. Suppose there exists c ∈ C such that |ν(c)| > |µ(c)|,
it means that there is a vacancy at c under µ and that there exists a student
s ∈ S such that ν(s) = c 6= µ(s). Furthermore, cPsµ(s) since ν Pareto-
dominates µ. And since we are only considering the soft bounds approach,
if there is a seat available at c and even if the maximal quota of the type
of student s is exceeded, then, s could be assigned to c. This means that
µ violates stability under soft bounds (which is impossible because µ is the
outcome of the DAA − SBt). So we have that |ν(c)| = |µ(c)| and every
student assigned under µ is also assigned under ν. 
Elhers et al. [EHYY12] shown another relevant property of the algorithm
previously described.
Theorem 7. For any problem of matching with indifferences and con-
straints, DAA-SB yields a matching that is stable under soft bounds and
18 VIRGINIE MARELLI, ANTONIO NICOLO`, TIMOTEO CARLETTI
non-wasteful under soft bounds. Moreover, this matching is S-optimal among
the set of matchings that satisfy the above properties.
This theorem holds only if schools have strict preferences over students.
In their study10, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. [APR09] concluded that any tie-
breaking rule leads to a loss of efficiency since the outcome of the DAA is not
more necessarily a S-optimal matching. They also proved that, considering
indifferences, a matching that can be produced by the DAA with some
multiple tie-breaking rule but cannot be produced by the DAA with any
single tie-breaking rule, is not S-optimal. For this reason, we will use a
single tie-breaking rule: a single tie-breaking to sort all students, the same
for every school; before applying the DAA−SB, for short DAA−STB−SB
in the following.
We are now able to present our extension of the results by Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al. [APR09] about efficiency. Let us first observe that in our simulations
we decide to sort randomly all the students (calling this random sorting,
random tie-breaking rule) and thus notice that
Remark 8. With the random tie-breaking rule, the DAA − STB − SB is
not S-optimal.
The above remark can easily be illustrated by the following example.
4.2.2. Not S-optimal example. Consider a matching problem with 8 stu-
dents, numbered from 1 up to 8, and 4 schools, A, B, C and D, such that
students and schools have the preferences reported in the Tables 2 and 3:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A A B A B C C C
D B A D C B A D
Table 2. Students’ preferences
A B C D
3 7 6 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 2 5 5 7 -
4 5 6 8 3 1 4 7 8 8 -
- - 6 1 2 3 -
Table 3. Schools’ preferences
Assume that there exist two types of students, normal and disadvantaged
and assume moreover that students 1, 2, 5, 7 belong to type normal while the
remaining ones to type disadvantaged.
Finally, every school has a capacity of 2 and schools A,B and C must
admit at least one disadvantaged student.
10Note that authors in [APR09] only consider the unconstrained case.
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A random sort of the students can provide the following results: 3 ≻ 4 ≻
1 ≻ 2 ≻ 5 ≻ 7 ≻ 6 ≻ 8. Then applying the DAA − SB we get the final
stable matching µ:
µ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
D B A D C B A C
)
Let us observe that the former is Pareto-dominated by the following stable
matching:
µ∗ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
D A A D B B C C
)
We then have proved that theDAA−SB with the random single tie-breaking
rule is not S-optimal.
The following question naturally rises: does there exist a matching rule
which is Pareto-optimal? And if not, is it possible to find a matching rule
that Pareto-improves upon the DAA− STB − SB?
For a sake of completeness we hereby report the summary of properties
of the different algorithms, where X is the unknown matching rule.
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
Properties
Algorithm
DAA DAA-STB + SICAa DAA-SB DAA-STB-SB + X
Preferencesb Strict Non strict Strict Non strict
Quotas No No Yes Yes
Stabilityc Stable Stable Stable Stable
S-optimal Yes Yes Yes unknown
Strategy-proofness Yes No Yes No
Table 4. Properties of the different algorithms.
aSICA is a mechanism used by Erdil and Ergin to Pareto-improve over the DAA. For
more details, see [EE08].
bPreferences are the ones of the schools
cThe definition of stability depends on whether there are quotas or not. See Gale and
Shapley,([GS62]) for the definition of stability without quotas.
In the next part, we will apply genetic algorithms to our problem of
controlled school choice.
4.3. Numerical simulations. In this section, we develop a GA to study
whether it is possible to get a Pareto-improvement upon the matching ob-
tained trough the DAA− STB − SB. Our numerical simulation is directly
inspired by the Belgian school system even if we introduce some simplifica-
tions, in particular we only consider 15 schools and 1750 students. According
to the Belgian law, we define two types of students: ISEF students 11 and
the ’normal’ students, and we assume that 20% of students population be-
long to the ISEF type. Every student strictly ranks 5 schools and schools
11ISEF will be the abbreviation for socially disadvantaged students.
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are indifferent among students. We took exactly the same number of seats
available as the total amount of students and schools’ capacities vary from
50 to 200. Each school should at least have 20% of ISEF students (minimal
quota) 12.
Students’ preferences are created using a random scheme: for each stu-
dent, we pick up and sort, with uniform probability, 5 schools among the
15 available ones. Then, 400 matchings are also randomly drawn, to form
the initial population of chromosomes, i.e. possible solutions. In order to
evaluate a matching, we need to define a fitness, whose optimisation should
produce solutions meeting our objectives. We choose the following arbitrary
utility function, for each student s:
us(µ(s)) =

 1−
rs(µ(s))− 1
|Ps|
if µ(s) ∈ Ps
0 otherwise.
∀s ∈ S ,
where rs(µ(s)) is the ranking of school µ(s) in student-s’ preferences and |Ps|
the length of student-s’ preferences, that is 5 in our case. If the matching is
not stable under soft bounds, the fitness is set to zero, otherwise the fitness
is defined as the normalised sum of utilities for all students such that the
fitness lies between 0 and 1. Thereby, we ensure that if the fitness is positive
then our matching is stable.
Since we want to improve upon the DAA− STB − SB, we first execute
this algorithm and then we use the obtained matching, let us call it µ, to
form the initial population for the GA, more precisely in a population of
size 800, 400 chromosomes will be exactly equal to µ. When calculating the
fitness of a matching, we also check whether it is a Pareto-improvement of
µ and if not, the fitness is penalised to make it smaller than the fitness of
µ, for instance by multiplying the former by a small enough number. Thus,
the only matchings which have a fitness higher than µ are Pareto-improving
upon it.
Because of the constraints present in the model, for instance each student
can appear in a chromosome only once and the same holds for each school,
the crossover and mutation operators cannot be the basic ones that would
not respect such constraints. The crossover we decided to use is called in
the literature PMX and has been introduced by Olivier et al. [OSH87] in
the Traveller Salesman Problem. We do not describe this operator here, we
only fix the probability of crossover to 0.5. The mutation is a permutation of
students, respecting the quotas, such that students get a school they prefer
whenever it is possible. We fix the probability of mutation to 0.4.
Finally, the selection operator acts as usual by giving more chances to
be selected to chromosomes whose fitness is larger, in this way we are sure
12The choice of the number of students, of schools, of preferences that students may
express, the proportion of disadvantaged students, the capacities of the schools and their
quotas are chosen to reproduce the real data’s of Namur district, in Belgium.
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that matchings who are a Pareto-improvement of µ will survive and match-
ings that are not stable will never be selected. Our GA will stop after 20
generations.
Because of the inherently random structure of the GA, we need to produce
several replicas to draw our conclusions. So we ran the DAA− STB − SB
followed by the GA, for 100 times. For each simulation, we only consider
the best matching found by our GA and report the average improvement
in Table 5. The results are very positive since we actually get Pareto-
improvements upon the matching of the DAA−STB−SB (some students
are better off and none is worse off) and those matchings are also stable.
Unfortunately, there is no way to know whether further improvements are
possible because genetic algorithms are not deterministic and convergence
can not be proved theoretically. By the Theorem 5, we also know that this
mechanism is not strategy-proof, even tough it is less manipulable since it is
a random process. It is difficult to cheat on the own preferences when you
don’t know what the final outcome will be.
Let us observe that Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. [APR09] were able to improve
the DAA, without quotas, to find a S-optimal matching where on average
1.9% of students are better of. Considering that our problem is far more
complicated, because of the introduction of quotas, we believe that an aver-
age of 0.8% students who are better off, remains a relevant result. Even if
our final matching may not be S-optimal, we strengthen our previous result
that is, when preferences are not strict, the DAA-STB-SB fails to obtain a
S-optimal matching and a Pareto-improvement can be found. We conclude
saying that genetic algorithm are an alternative to Pareto-improve upon the
DAA-STB-SB, they allowed us to improve the students’ welfare.
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❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳❳
Choice
Algorithm
DAA-STB-SB DAA-STB-SB + GA Improvement ♯ students
1 1245.3
(27.4963)
1254.3 (27.4084) +1 7.30
(1.8007)
2 222.55
(16.8369)
221.85 (16.5642) +2 3.80
(1.9746)
3 130.20
(11.7748)
127.55 (11.4877) +3 2.45
(1.4381)
4 69.40 (7.9671) 65.85 (8.5474) +4 0.75
(0.7017)
5 37.25(5.2211) 35.10(4.9329) +5 0 (0)
Unassigned 45.35 (6.3347) 45.35 (6.3347) - 0 (0)
Total 1750 1750 14.30
(2.6034)
Table 5. Pareto-Improvement, using GA, average of 100
simulations. The first column reports the ranking of the
school received by students; the second column reports the
average number of students receiving their first choice, sec-
ond, etc from the DAA-STB-SB; the third column reports
the average number of students receiving their first choice,
second, etc from the DAA-STB-SB+GA; the forth column re-
ports the number of places that students improve, according
to their rank order list; the fifth column reports the average
number of students improving from the GA. The standard
deviation is reported in brackets.
5. Discussion and open questions
Our main point with the present work, was to show that genetic algo-
rithms can be useful in economic problems that are computationally hard,
such as hedonic games and school choice with indifferences and quotas. The
difficulty of the latter problems is mainly in the constraints that should hold.
Based on the previous results, we can safely state that in both cases, ge-
netic algorithms allowed us to Pareto-improve upon the existing algorithms.
Genetic algorithms seems more general than other existing algorithms of
matching and they can easily be adapted to other problems. There still
remains open questions about the theoretical characterisation of genetic al-
gorithms, however such questions go beyond the scope of the present work
and will deserve further investigations.
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